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Abstract
Most internet auction sites, like eBay, use a proxy bidding system where
bidders can put in their maximum bid and let a proxy bidder (a computer) bid
for them. Yet many bidders speculate about how to bid and employ bidding
strategies. This paper examines how the timing of bids can affect the final
price. In a unique data set of 17,000 Scandinavian furniture auctions it turns
out that early price increases, i.e. much early bidding, scare off bidders and
therefore result in lower prices, whereas much late bidding results in higher
prices. Sniping is therefore not a successful strategy to avoid bidding wars.
∗Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Kurt Nielsen, Svend Rasmussen and Peter Bogetoft
for helpful comments. Also, I am especially grateful to Henrik Hansen for both discussions and
methodological help throughout the process.
1 Introduction
As a potential bidder in an internet auction one of the questions you are faced
with is when to bid. Obviously, you want to buy the item as cheap as possible,
so perhaps you should use a bidding strategy. On one hand you could bid early,
perhaps to scare off potential bidders, but also risk making a higher price familiar.
On the other hand, you could wait and bid in the last minute to surprise other
bidders. Or maybe you wonder if there, at all, is an effect of the timing of bids.
Since the emergence of internet auction sites like eBay in the late 1990s there have
been numerous articles analyzing this new easy accessible source of auction data.
Most of the early articles focused on testing traditional auction theory, like the
winners curse or revenue equivalence, but bidding behavior has recently received
more attention. Still, it has shown difficult to get significant results as it is very
difficult to infer anything from bidders who follow different strategies and often
have very hidden preferences.
Basically, if the bidders had a fixed willingness to pay (WTP) no effect of a bidding
strategy should be seen. The proxy bidding procedure of e.g. eBay should motivate
bidders to simply put in their WTP sometimes during the auction. However, there
is a widespread tendency for bidders to bid late or even in the last minutes (known
as sniping)1. The question is if this behavior is a response to the specific auction
environment, or if it actually is a successful strategy to buy the item cheaper2.
On eBay there are factors that could justify the widespread use of late bidding. One
reason is the large number of similar goods. A bidder will therefore be inclined to
wait and see which of the items that will end up being the cheapest. Another rea-
son is uncertainty about the item’s (common) value. Thus, a bidder will be most
informed about the value when all other bidders have made their bidding (Bajari
and Hortacsu, 2003). Finally, the hard ending (no extension of the auction) will
motivate bidders to snipe in order to surprise inexperienced or/and incremental3
bidders, who then are not able to respond in time (Roth and Ockenfels, 2002; Ock-
enfels and Roth, 2006).
In this article I analyze 17,076 furniture auctions from Lauritz.com – a Scandina-
vian internet auction site – but unlike eBay, the generic reasons for bidding late are
minimized. If there were no underlying preference dynamics you would therefore
1See e.g. Ockenfels and Roth (2002), Ockenfels and Roth (2006) or the review of Bajari and
Hortacsu (2004).
2The study by Hou (2007) does conclude that late bidding decreases the auction price. However,
it does not take the endogeneity of bidders into account and is only controlling for the final number
of bidders in the auction. As this analysis shows, decreasing the entry of bidders is the whole point
of bidding early. Thus, I am not convinced about the validity of this result.
3Bidders who simply bid the next available bid, not using the proxy bidding feature
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expect no effect of the timing of bids. But that is far from the case.
Auctions with a price jump late in the auction, i.e. a high proportion of late bid-
ding, on average end up with a price significantly higher (up to +17%) than other
auctions. In contrast do auctions with an early jump in price on average end up
with much lower prices (down to -45%) than other auctions. Furthermore, these
results are reproduced in a more general model of each auctions distribution of
price increases.
This article therefore presents new empirical evidence suggesting that there are un-
derlying preference dynamics influencing bidding behavior. As a response, bidders
should in fact bid early to get it cheap.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the auction and the data.
Section 3 discusses how to compare the outcome of auctions with different items.
Section 4 is the initial analysis of timing effects, and in section 5 I am questioning
why, using Instrument Variable Regression. In section 6 I discuss and conclude.
2 The data
Lauritz.com is an auction primarily house based in Denmark, but with activities in
Germany, Norway, and Sweden. All its auctions are internet auctions much like
eBay.com, but there are some important differences. Lauritz.com is not only an
internet site, but also a physical auction house with 18 locations (2007) where the
goods are located and available for inspection during business hours. Potential
bidders therefore have the opportunity to examine the goods thoroughly before
bidding. Moreover, Lauritz.com was a traditional auction house before 2000 and
has kept the tradition of making an expert estimate of the value of the items – the
Valuation. Both of these two features contribute to minimize the information about
quality from other people’s biddings. Thus, at least partly, this takes away the
common value argument for bidding late.
The particular data, to which I have access, are all the modern furniture auctions
from 2005, which amounts to about 37,000 auctions4. More specifically, I have
access to the complete bidding histories, time of start and expiration etc., much
like what is online on any eBay auction just after expiry. The only difference to
the, in principle, public available data on eBay or Lauritz.com is that I also have
the winning bidder’s last bid, and also if the winner returned the item.
Furniture is one of the traditional goods for auction houses, and especially Lau-
4In modern furniture there are two categories: 1) miscellaneous (29%) and 2) tables and
chairs (71%)
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ritz.com has branded itself as reselling classic Scandinavian furniture designs. While
Laurtiz.com was well established on the Danish market in 2005, this was a period
of expansion in Germany and Sweden. I have therefore limited my analysis to the
27,000 Danish auctions. Since this is an analysis of bidding pattern, I have further-
more restricted the data to auctions with at least two bidders (otherwise we would
not observe any bidding pattern). Excluding some extremes, this brings the total
number of auctions down to 17,0765.
The typical procedure is that the seller brings the item to the nearest auction house
where an expert makes a valuation. If the seller is satisfied with the valuation
and the probable sale, Lauritz.com puts it on the internet site with the auction
expiration exactly one week later6. By policy none of the auctions have a reserve
price, but the first available bid is $50 (2005) since this will cover the minimum
fee to Lauritz.com for the seller. Generally, the seller will pay 10% of the reached
auction price (if above $500), and the buyer must pay 20% plus a fixed fee of $57.
During the auction bidders can either bid the next available bid (the current price
plus some predetermined increment of e.g. $20) or use the max-bid service (proxy
bidder) and let the auction site bid for you. In economic terms, bidders can there-
fore bid as if it was a normal first price ascending auction, or as if it was a sort of
second price auction by putting in their maximum bid. This bidding procedure is
very close to the proxy bidding system used on eBay, only the max bids are also
restricted to the increments. However, if a bid arrives within the last 3 minutes the
auction is extended with 3 minutes. This is a so-called soft ending since there will
always be at least 3 minutes of time to react.
Once the auction is over, the winner can pick up the item at the physical auction
house. Due to the Danish Sale of Goods Act there is, however, the rather peculiar
feature that buyers can regret and return the item within two weeks. Although this
feature could potentially have an affect, I do not think it presents a problem for this
analysis8.
The vast majority of the auctions are unique at the time of sale. Surely, there are
5Only auctions with a valuation between $200 and $6,000 are included. Also, there are a few auc-
tions with an error in the time of start that have been altered by mistake and they have subsequently
been removed
6To even out the load, some are put for sale or set for expiration during the evening, but almost
all the auctions have close to one week of duration, and the selected auction all have a duration of 7
days +/- 6 hours
7Since these are Danish auctions all prices are originally in DKK but they have been converted to
USD here, where $1 = DKK 5 (2008)
8If there is uncertainty about WTP, it can potentially make it less costly to bid to much if you
can regret. However, bidders will still have incentive to bid what they believe is their WTP. Further-
more, there are transaction costs and only a limited number do actually use the option (in this data,
6.5%). In comparison to eBay, where a bidder can ignore the purchase perhaps with a black listing
as consequence, bidding on Lauritz.com seems to be more committing.
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some repetitions and classics that are sold in greater numbers, but it is rare to find
competing items at a given time. Thus, bidders do not need to wait to find out
which of the similar items to bid for.
With distinctive items that are professionally valuated and the soft ending, Lau-
ritz.com is a unique internet auction environment where almost all of the practical
and game theoretic arguments for bidding late are absent. From a neoclassical
point of view it should therefore not matter what bidding strategy you choose.
3 Comparing prices between auctions
The exercise in this paper is basically to test the effect of the differences in the tim-
ing of bids amongst otherwise identical auctions in order to answer basic questions
like: should you bid sooner or later? But before approaching the main question of
timing, a more immediate challenge appears; How do you measure a price effect
from 17,076 different items/auctions?
Clearly, it is not meaningful to make a simple comparison between the reached
prices. A dining chair reaching $400 might be a much better price for the seller than
a sofa reaching $1000. The measure I will employ is therefore the price relative to
the valuation made by Laurtiz.com. In other words, if one auctions ends up with a
higher Price/Valuation (P/V) ratio than another it indicates a relatively higher price.
Although valuation is a good proxy for the relative attractiveness of the product, it
is not enough if we want to make a fair comparison between auctions. Some items
are in thin markets and risk being sold at very low prices no matter the auction
development. Some items are more common and popular and therefore more con-
sistently priced. And some products are just worth much more than Laurtitz.com
initially expected and sold at a large premium compared to the valuation. As a
result there is a huge variation in the P/V as Figure 1 shows.
You could argue that we actually do not need to make a fair comparison between
single auctions as we are just interested in the average effect of timing. Yet, there
is most likely a correlation between the relative popularity of an item and the bid-
ding pattern of that auction. You could for instance expect more bidding wars right
before expiration if more bidders are interested in an item. A certain effect of price
pattern could therefore in reality be a result of popularity. To rule out this possibil-
ity, the statistical analysis must somehow control for the underlying popularity on
the market.
The obvious measure for popularity or “attractiveness” is the number of bidders
participating in the auction, and as expected there is a clear and strong relationship
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Figure 1: Number of auctions with a certain P/V ratio
between the number of bidders (N) and the P/V ratio. An extra bidder does for
instance result in a price increase of 6.5% on average9. The major problem is,
however, that the number of bidders cannot be used as a controlling variable as
this variable is endogenous. As an example, consider the effect of a certain reserve
price (sometimes called the minimum price or starting bid). A high reserve price
will most likely reduce the number of bidders, since the bidders with a willingness
to pay below the reserve price naturally will not come forward with a bid. The
direct effect of a higher reserve price is therefore fewer bidders on average.
The auctions here do not have a reserve price, but the same problem will appear
if the price in one auction increases fast compared to other auctions10 . In fact,
as scarring off bidders is one of the possible effects of the bid early strategy, it is
crucial not to ignore this endogeneity problem.
An alternative proxy for popularity that does not have this endogeneity problem is
the initial number of bidders11. To equalize between e.g. morning, I define initial
bidders as the number of bidders the first 24 hours, denoted N24h. Although this
may not be as good a proxy for market interest as the total number of bidders, it
still does hint at the underlying interest amongst potential costumers12. Also, it
does seem to be a reasonable proxy as the correlation between N24h and N is 0.69.
Thus, N24hi will be used as a control for “attractiveness” for auction i.
To conclude, an auction with a high price is defined as an auction with a relative
9The result of a simple least squared regression with P/V as a response of the Number of bidders
10Assuming that bidding is distributed during the auction week.
11Alternatively, it could also be the number of bids or/and the initial price increase, but this might
say more about bidding strategies than of underlying interest.
12You could argue that a rapid price increase will also effect entry within the 24 hours, but I do not
think it is very decisive.
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high Price/Valuation ratio compared to other auctions with, in principle: 1) the
same N24h), 2) the same Valuation (V ) and 3) the same values for other controls
denoted X , like the time of day and the day of week. More precisely, the analysis
in this paper will be based on least squared regression with a structure of Equation
(1).
Pi/Vi = f (PricePatterni)+ g(N24hi , Vi, Xi)+ εi
where εi are i.i.d.
(1)
The exact specification of the controls, g(), can be found in Appendix A. Moreover
g() will stay unchanged throughout, whereas the effect of price patterns, material-
ized in the function f (), will be separated and analyzed.
4 Timing effects
The 17,076 auctions contain roughly 353,000 unique bids from 30,600 individual
bidders. The objective here is to convert this micro-level data into some standard-
ized testable characteristics at the auction (macro) level in order to link auction-
level price effects to micro-level bidding. Hence, the idea is to define and discuss
the effect of the function f () from equation (1).
4.1 Price Jumps
As mentioned, one could have the strategy to scare off other bidders by driving
up the price early, i.e. a so-called jump bid (if successful). The other strategy of
particular interest is that of late bidding. A straightforward way of categorizing
auctions with these strategies is to look for price jumps early and late in the auc-
tion. Yet, an absolute jump in the price does not necessarily reveal anything about
a strategy. A price increase of $100 could be a large increase for something inex-
pensive, but a small increase for something expensive. Of course, you could be a
bit more sophisticated and define a jump as a certain percentage of the valuation,
but as the valuation is imperfect the basic problem remains.
What is relevant is the distribution of the actual price increases. A bidder deciding
on a strategy will basically either bid now or wait. Thus, if much of the total price
increase happens early in the auction some key bidders must actively have chosen
to bid early rather than to wait13. On the other hand, if key bidders wait and use
late bidding a large proportion of the total price increase must happen during the
13Recall that this is like a second price auction meaning that you are dependent on another bidder
to bid up the price. Yet a price jump early will still be an indication of some bidders deciding to bid
early. Also, as a bidder taking the bid early strategy this might be what you hope for.
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last hours or even minutes. Until that point the price will therefore be relatively
low compared to the final price. The relevant measure of strategies must therefore
be price jumps relative to the entire price increase. The first categorizations of
price patterns (and thus the underlying bidding strategies) is a number of binary
variables defined as:
jumpi tsmall =
{
1, if the price increase for auction i at time t is 40% - 50% of the total
0, else
jumpi t large =
{
1, if the price increase for auction i at time t is >50% of the total
0, else
These jumps are defined for t = {1,2, ...,9}, where
t = 1 is defined as Day 1 (the first 24 hours)
t = 2 is defined as Day 2 (24h to 48h)
...
t = 6 is Day 6 until 2.a.m.
t = 7 is Day 7 until 3 hours before the end
t = 8 is -3 hours until -15 minutes (-3h)
t = 9 is the last 15 minutes (-15min)
I did not take into account any of the 3 minutes extensions of the soft ending which
implies that if an auction was extended 2 x 3 minutes, t = 9 will be the last 9 min-
utes of the ordinary auction time and 6 minutes of extended time. The size of jumps
and the time intervals are of course rather arbitrary, but chosen to get a reasonable
number of auctions within each group without loosing the link to the strategies.
The exact proportion of auctions in each group is specified in Appendix A, but the
overall levels are:
34.4% does not have any jumps
25.3% has a small jump
35.2% has a large jump
2.7% has two small jumps
2.3% has a small and a large jump.
It turns out that the effect of such price jumps is surprisingly clear and consistent.
Figure 2 shows the estimates and 95% confidence intervals from regressing the
Price/Valuation ratio against these binary jump variables, i.e. a least squares re-
gression similar to that of Equation (1). The exact specification and results can be
seen in Appendix A.3.
Early jumps have a large and significant negative effect on the final price, large and
early jumps having the largest negative effect. Yet, on the last day this effect is
reversed. If the jump happens within the last 3 hours there is a significant positive
effect on prices. Hence, if you are a bidder this result suggests that you should bid
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Figure 2: Average effect on P/V from price jumps
as early as possible and try to make the price jump.
4.2 Price Increase Distributions
While the price jumps and the time intervals may seem arbitrary, another approach
is to look directly at the distribution of price increases. Again, we have in principle
17,076 different distributions, but many do share some characteristics. Fitting a
relative simple parametric function is therefore a feasible approach. In particular,
it seems reasonable to look among probability distribution functions as probability
distributions and price increase distribution would naturally share some character-
istics (Price start in zero and end up at 100% of the final price – much like a cumu-
lative probability distribution). The challenge is to find a probability distribution
function which is both flexible and possible to interpret with respect to strategies.
Among the hyperlinks at Lauritz.com’s front page there is one for “New items”
and one for “Last Chance”. This, together with the bid early or late strategies,
could lead to a over-representation of bids the first and last day, and if you look
further into the data this is in fact the case. 19% of all the unique bids arrive the
first day and 46% the last day14. As a consequence, the potential density function
needs to be able to take a sort of U-shape. Still, the bidding can of course also
be characterized by more complex patterns. The potential density function must
therefore also be able to take other shapes like an inverted U.
One density function which can contain most such bidding patterns in a simple
14Unique bids defined as a bidder manually making a bid no matter if it is a max-bid or just an
increment.
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manner is the Beta distribution function. Furthermore, the two parameters (α and
β) of the Beta distribution are easy to interpret in relation to the bid early or late
strategies. To illustrate, consider the different specifications of a Beta probability
density function in Figure 3. α is directly linked to the proportion of early price
increases, and β to the late price increases. The lower the parameters, the higher
the proportion of price increases. When α = β = 1 it is a uniform distribution and
if α < 1 and β < 1, the distribution has a U-shape with a high proportion of price
increases early and late.
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Figure 3: Beta distributions
It is relatively simple to estimate α and β for every auction as this can be done from
the empirical mean and variance with the method-of-moments (see Appendix A.2).
The result of this estimation is that 60.6% of the auctions have estimates of α and
β where they both are below 1, and only 19.6% where they both are above. Thus,
as expected most auctions are estimated to have U-shape distributions of bidding.
Figure 4 shows the estimated effects of αˆ and ˆβ on the Price/Valuation ratio. They
are found in a regression similar to that of section 4.1, but where the function f ()
from Equation (1) is defined as:
f () = a11 · ln(αˆi)+ a12 · ln(αˆi)2 + a21 · ln( ˆβi)+ a22 · ln( ˆβi)2
The figure shows a clear negative effect of higher ˆβ and a clear positive effect
of higher αˆ. Furthermore, the estimated parameters, a11,a12,a21,a22 are highly
significant which also can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals shown with
the broken lines (very close to the estimate). In fact, this model with only two
variables describing the price pattern, seems to be a much better model than that in
section 4.1, as it increases the adjusted R2 with 0.08 to 0.34. The full results of the
regression can be found in Appendix A.3.
The interpretation of this result is a bit more tricky than the jumps. Higher αˆ means
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Figure 4: Effect on P/V of estimated α and β
a lower proportion of price increases in the beginning of auction. In other words,
the more price increases in the beginning (lower αˆ), the lower the average prices.
For ˆβ the effect is the opposite; The higher the proportion of price increases late in
the auction (lower ˆβ), the higher the average price. To further quantify, consider
the estimated effects of the lower (Q1) and upper quartile (Q1) for αˆ and ˆβ in Table
115. Basically, both the sign and the magnitude supports the effects found from
price jumps.
αˆ ˆβ
Q1 -31% +38%
Q3 +8% +1%
Table 1: Quantifying the effect of αˆ and ˆβ
5 Instrumental Variable Regression
One possible explanation for these results is that early price increase scare off bid-
ders. As argued, this was one of the reasons for using N24h instead of total N to
control for popularity. To dig a little deeper, it is therefore natural to look at the
indirect effect which price jumps have on total N. This is easily done by replacing
P/V with N as the dependent variable in the first regression of section 4.1. The
result of this OLS regression can be found in Appendix B, but the main results are
shown in Figure 5.
15The values for these quartiles are: Qαˆ1 = 0.28, Qαˆ3 = 1.49, Q
ˆβ
1 = 0.17, and Q
ˆβ
3 = 0.93
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As shown, all jumps have a negative effect on the total number of bidders entering
the auction. Also, large and early jumps are more efficient to reduce entry. How-
ever, this is as expected as a higher price naturally would deter some bidders from
entering. The question is if this effect is powerful enough to be the driving factor.
To answer this question, the last step must be to isolate the direct effect of price
jumps on prices. In other words, if the indirect effect of reduced entry is taken into
account, what is the remaining effect of jumps on prices?
Such an analysis can be performed as Instrumental Variable (IV) regression using
a two stage least square procedure. The first step in this procedure is to predict
total N on the basis of jumps, N24h and other controls. This is the regression from
above. This predicted N is then used as exogenous variable in the next regression
where P/V is the dependent variable.
In theory, the two regression must be estimated simultaneously as the error terms
will be correlated16 . Traditionally, this procedure is therefore represented as a sys-
tems of equations as shown in Equation (2), where N24h is said to be the instrument
for N. {
Pi/Vi = f ( jumpsi)+ g(Ni, Vi, zi)+ εi
Ni = f ( jumpsi)+ g(N24hi , Vi, zi)+ νi
(2)
The result of this IV regression shows that the direct (intrinsic) effects of jumps on
prices are generally positive as shown in Figure 617. This is more the case the larger
16In practice they are however estimated in a two step procedure, but where the error terms are
adjusted subsequently
17The full result can be found in Appendix C.
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and later the jumps are. In itself a price jump will therefore most likely contribute
to higher prices perhaps as a sort of momentum effect in the short run.
To conclude, price jumps have a positive intrinsic effect, but because they also
scare off bidders this effect can be reversed. The surprising part is, however, that
the deterrence effect is often so strong that the positive intrinsic effect is likely
to be reversed. Naturally this is more the case the sooner the price jump, but the
deterrence effect is in fact so strong that up until the last 3 hours, it will dominate
on average.
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Figure 6: Intrinsic effect of price jumps (IV regression)
This analysis can similarly be performed with the estimated parameters from the
Beta distribution of section 4.2. Instead of analyzing the effect of αˆ and ˆβ on
the total number of bidders, I will go directly to the Instrumental variable (IV)
regression. The result of this (IV) regression can be found in Figure 718. Here the
effect of IV estimates are shown on top of the estimates from section 4.2. Clearly,
this shows that removing the deterrence effect on bidders does moderate the effect
of early and late bidding (low αˆ and ˆβ), but the effect is not reversed as in the case
of jumps.
The overall conclusion is that early price increases on average always will scare
off bidders. Price jumps may scare off more bidders, but will perhaps also lead
to a momentum effect and have a positive intrinsic effect on the price. But since
a bidder cannot control how other bidders bid up the price, the important conclu-
sion is that an early bid, whether this leads to slow or fast early price increases,
unambiguously is the best strategy.
The advice for later entry is on the other hand always to try to jump the price. Late
18The full result can be found in in Appendix C
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Figure 7: Effect on P/V (IV estimation)
price increase will no matter the size intrinsically lead to higher prices, perhaps
because the relative low price will always attract potential bidders19. Yet a price
jump will on average also later on prevent some of these potential late bidders
from entering, and the net effect on the final price from late jumps is therefore less
positive than a more slow, but also late price increases.
6 Discussion
The analysis in this article suggests that the timing of bids does matter, and unlike
the prototypical behavior it seems to be a dominating strategy to bid sooner rather
than later. Although both approaches (jumps and the Beta distributions) might
seem a little artificial, I do believe that the combination makes a strong argument.
There is, however, one possible critique; the potential endogeneity of (N24h). Prin-
cipally, both jumps day 1 and αˆ do influence N24h in the same way that the general
price pattern makes total N endogenous. Yet, if we follow this logic, the effect of a
price increase on day 1 must in fact be even more negative, had the N24h not been
negatively influenced by that early price increase. Hence, this argument will only
make the conclusion stronger.
Generally, you could also have doubts about the effectiveness of the controlling
variables. In principal there could still be some unobserved variables, e.g. lower
quality, which is the real explanation behind the lower price of auctions with early
19Thus also called sniping bate
14
price increases. However, auctions with much of the price increase early do gener-
ally have more initial bidders than the average auction. Thus, this does not indicate
lower quality, rather the opposite, so perhaps the deterrence effect is even stronger
than estimated here. Again, this could make the conclusion stronger rather than
weaker.
In a broader perspective these results basically tell us that the entry threshold is
often different from the final bid. Hence bidders must change their willingness
to pay during the auction. That is in itself not too surprising as other analysis on
eBay data have had the same insinuation20 . This analysis does, however, give a
little more insight into how this change in preference is triggered. It seems to be
coursed by either the relative low price or the momentum in the price increase. Let
me take each case separately.
The positive intrinsic effect of price jumps cf. Figure 6 could suggest some mo-
mentum in the bidding. Once the price starts to increase, bidders might get excited
and competitive. Ariely and Simonsohn (Forthcomming) e.g. show that auctions
with a low reserve, and hence many bidders/bids, have a higher probability of
receiving more bids than similar auctions with a higher reserve price and fewer
bidders/bids.
This kind of competitive behavior might even turn into “auction fever” where bid-
ders get carried away by the idea of winning, see e.g. Lee and Malmendier (2006)
or Ariely and Simonsen (2003). However, auctions with late jumps (auctions with
a high likelihood of “auction fever”) have a lower probability of return21. Thus,
bidders who won the item in a very competitive auction will less often take ad-
vantage of the 14 days right to return as provided by the auction house. “Auction
fever” does therefore not seem to be a dominating explanation.
The other explanation is that bidders seem to be attracted by the “good deal” and
once they have entered they get caught. This could therefore be an example of
the so-called pseudo- or quasi-endowment effect as suggested by e.g. Ariely et al.
(2004) and Wolf et al. (2005). Basically, the idea is that bidders get used to the
idea of buying and will therefore be willing to increase their bids in order to avoid
the loss of this pseudo-endowment.
The results here suggest that this effect is especially pronounced when prices are
relative low and bidders get overoptimistic about their possibility to win. In other
words, it is when bidders expect to win with a high probability that they feel owner-
ship and get caught in the auction. This analysis does in fact suggests that bidders
either create this feeling of ownership very fast or create it before entering e.g. dur-
20see e.g. Ariely et al. (2004), Ariely and Simonsohn (Forthcomming), Ku et al. (2005), or Wolf
et al. (2005).
21See the logit model of return in Appendix D
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ing observation. However, these conclusion are still on a very speculative level so
this is an obvious area for further research.
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APPENDIX
A Basic regressions behind Timing Effects
The main results of this paper, i.e. the effects on the Price/Valuation (P/V) ratio
of section 4, is based on a simple Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regression. As
discussed in section 3, the controlling variables is of great importance to the relia-
bility of the result. I have therefore used all available controls without considering
significance level. With the large amount of degrees of freedom there is no need to
reduce the model as much as possible. The controlling variables are therefore:
Initial bidders the first 24 hours (N24h) As discussed, the most important con-
trolling variable in the basic regression is the initial bidders as a proxy for
underlying interest. Besides a linear term there is also a quadratic and a cubic
term as they are also significant.
Valuation Even though valuation is also used to define the dependent variable
(P/V), valuation is also in itself an important explanatory variable. Further-
more, the interaction between Valuation and N24h is also significant.
Hour Auctions finish throughout the day from 8 a.m. to midnight. As some hours
may be more successful than others, I therefore us this as a control.
Weekday Similarly auctions are sold throughout the week although very few on
Sundays.
Month Wintertime is more busy and, as it turns out, more successful in getting
higher prices.
Category As mentioned, 71% of the auctions are in the “Table and chairs” and
29% are in the “miscellaneous” group. I also use these categories as controls.
A.1 Jumps
The first regression uses price jumps as dummy variables as a categorization of the
price structure. In section 4.1 includes the reasoning and definition of these jumps.
The exact sizes of the jumps are of course a bit arbitrary, but they are principal
chosen to get a even distribution of the auctions. The percentage of auctions with
a certain jump is listed in Table 1.
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6 Day 7 -3hours -15min
Small jumps 6.5% 2.0% 1.9% 1.6% 1.7% 4.8% 4.7% 5.3% 2.2%
Large jumps 8.5% 2.2% 2.6% 2.2% 2.7% 8.1% 7.1% 5.0% 1.4%
Table 2: Auctions with jumps17
A.2 The Beta distribution
The second regression utilizes the Beta distribution to describe the price pattern.
The probability density function of the beta distribution is defined as:
f (x;α,β) = x
α−1(1− x)β−1∫ 1
0 u
α−1(1−u)β−1 du
I use the method-of-moments estimates of the two parameters in the beta distribu-
tion. In other words αˆ and ˆβ are calculated from the empirical mean, x¯, and the
empirical variance, v, as:
αˆ = x¯
(
x¯(1−x¯)
v
−1
)
and ˆβ = (1− x¯)
(
x¯(1−x¯)
v
−1
)
A.3 Results
Regression 1: Regression 2:
Jumps Beta distribution
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 0.8348 0.1243 *** 0.6455 0.1176 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -0.3507 0.0126 *** - -
jump2 0.4-0.5 -0.0883 0.0213 *** - -
jump3 0.4-0.5 -0.0725 0.0221 ** - -
jump4 0.4-0.5 -0.1047 0.0237 *** - -
jump5 0.4-0.5 -0.0653 0.0232 ** - -
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.0465 0.0142 ** - -
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.0079 0.0144 - -
jump3h 0.4-0.5 0.1134 0.0137 *** - -
jump15min 0.4-0.5 0.1038 0.0206 *** - -
jump1 >0.5 -0.4546 0.0114 *** - -
jump2 >0.5 -0.2131 0.0209 *** - -
jump3 >0.5 -0.1955 0.0194 *** - -
jump4 >0.5 -0.1563 0.0207 *** - -
jump5 >0.5 -0.1795 0.0192 *** - -
jump6 >0.5 -0.1092 0.012 *** - -
jump7 >0.5 -0.0637 0.0125 *** - -
jump3h >0.5 0.1705 0.0144 *** - -
jump15min >0.5 0.0849 0.0255 *** - -
a11 : ln(αˆ) - - 0.2070 0.0035 ***
a12 : ln(αˆ)2 - - -0.0264 0.0005 ***
a21 : ln( ˆβ) - - -0.1753 0.0032 ***
a22 : ln( ˆβ)2 - - 0.0232 0.0007 ***
Valuation -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 ***
N24h 0.2146 0.0074 *** 0.2820 0.0079 ***
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
(N24h)2 -0.0257 0.0023 *** -0.0376 0.0024 ***
(N24h)3 0.0011 0.0002 *** 0.0016 0.0002 ***
Valuation*N24h 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Modern furniture - tables and chairs 0.0021 0.0066 0.0184 0.0062 **
factor(Month)2 0.0038 0.0167 0.0028 0.0158
factor(Month)3 -0.0599 0.0171 *** -0.0568 0.0162 ***
factor(Month)4 -0.0797 0.0167 *** -0.0761 0.0158 ***
factor(Month)5 -0.0804 0.0163 *** -0.0796 0.0154 ***
factor(Month)6 -0.0948 0.0162 *** -0.0957 0.0153 ***
factor(Month)7 -0.0970 0.0183 *** -0.1061 0.0173 ***
factor(Month)8 -0.0750 0.0163 *** -0.0728 0.0154 ***
factor(Month)9 -0.1055 0.0157 *** -0.1118 0.0149 ***
factor(Month)10 -0.0766 0.0165 *** -0.0808 0.0156 ***
factor(Month)11 -0.0962 0.0162 *** -0.0990 0.0153 ***
factor(Month)12 -0.0860 0.0170 *** -0.0919 0.0160 ***
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0097 0.0091 -0.0151 0.0086 .
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0084 0.0092 -0.0202 0.0087 *
factor(Ends weekday)4 -0.0116 0.0097 -0.0223 0.0092 *
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0002 0.0097 -0.0133 0.0092
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0626 0.0449 -0.0601 0.0426
factor(Ends weekday)7 0.0062 0.1947 -0.0234 0.1844
factor(Time of day)8 -0.0866 0.1264 -0.0957 0.1197
factor(Time of day)9 -0.0706 0.1242 -0.0794 0.1176
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0446 0.1238 -0.0588 0.1172
factor(Time of day)11 -0.0428 0.1236 -0.0443 0.1170
factor(Time of day)12 -0.0422 0.1235 -0.0444 0.1169
factor(Time of day)13 -0.0432 0.1234 -0.0519 0.1168
factor(Time of day)14 -0.0472 0.1233 -0.0601 0.1168
factor(Time of day)15 -0.0574 0.1233 -0.0646 0.1168
factor(Time of day)16 -0.0551 0.1235 -0.0690 0.1170
factor(Time of day)17 -0.0314 0.1237 -0.0488 0.1172
factor(Time of day)18 -0.0395 0.1286 -0.0579 0.1218
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0223 0.1590 -0.1347 0.1505
factor(Time of day)20 -0.1654 0.1615 -0.2073 0.1529
factor(Time of day)22 -0.1609 0.4079 -0.0568 0.3865
factor(Time of day)23 -0.1765 0.1615 -0.1324 0.1529
Residual standard error: 0.3886 Residual standard error: 0.3681
on 17019 degrees of freedom on 17033 degrees of freedom
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 Adjusted R2: 0.2642 Adjusted R2: 0.3396
Table 2: Effects on the Price/Valuation ratio
B Effect of jumps on total N
A first step to find an underlying explanation is to find the effect of jumps on the
total number of bidders. Compared to the first regression of Table 2, the depending
variable, P/V, is therefore simply replaced with the total number of bidders, N. The
results of this regression is listed in Table 4 below:
19
Estimate Std. Error
Intercept 4.6810 0.5927 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -1.7620 0.0600 ***
jump2 0.4-0.5 -0.9605 0.1017 ***
jump3 0.4-0.5 -1.0100 0.1054 ***
jump4 0.4-0.5 -1.0920 0.1130 ***
jump5 0.4-0.5 -1.0510 0.1105 ***
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.6581 0.0676 ***
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.4633 0.0686 ***
jump3h 0.4-0.5 -0.2088 0.0654 **
jump15min 0.4-0.5 -0.4712 0.0982 ***
jump1 >0.5 -2.9020 0.0546 ***
jump2 >0.5 -2.0120 0.0995 ***
jump3 >0.5 -2.1370 0.0925 ***
jump4 >0.5 -2.0480 0.0986 ***
jump5 >0.5 -2.1140 0.0915 ***
jump6 >0.5 -1.6440 0.0571 ***
jump7 >0.5 -1.3470 0.0595 ***
jump3h >0.5 -1.0120 0.0688 ***
jump15min >0.5 -1.1990 0.1215 ***
Valuation 0.0005 0.0000 ***
N24h 1.0830 0.0352 ***
(N24h)2 0.0267 0.0110 *
(N24h)3 0.0004 0.0009
Valuation*N24h -0.0001 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Modern furniture - tables and chairs 0.2421 0.0314 ***
factor(Month)2 -0.0198 0.0794
factor(Month)3 -0.1365 0.0814
factor(Month)4 -0.2971 0.0796 ***
factor(Month)5 -0.3675 0.0776 ***
factor(Month)6 -0.4599 0.0771 ***
factor(Month)7 -0.2808 0.0873 **
factor(Month)8 -0.3541 0.0779 ***
factor(Month)9 -0.2022 0.0749 **
factor(Month)10 0.0735 0.0787
factor(Month)11 -0.0624 0.0773
factor(Month)12 -0.0278 0.0808
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0342 0.0433
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0804 0.0436
factor(Ends weekday)4 -0.1110 0.0461 *
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0462 0.0463
factor(Ends weekday)6 0.0990 0.2143
factor(Ends weekday)7 1.4190 0.9285
factor(Time of day)8 -0.2703 0.6026
factor(Time of day)9 -0.2400 0.5924
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0556 0.5902
factor(Time of day)11 -0.1374 0.5895
factor(Time of day)12 -0.1883 0.5888
factor(Time of day)13 -0.2218 0.5883
factor(Time of day)14 -0.2795 0.5881
factor(Time of day)15 -0.4160 0.5883
factor(Time of day)16 -0.4533 0.5891
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error
factor(Time of day)17 -0.3317 0.5902
factor(Time of day)18 -0.1886 0.6133
factor(Time of day)19 -0.2950 0.7582
factor(Time of day)20 -1.4090 0.7701
factor(Time of day)22 0.4511 1.9450
factor(Time of day)23 -0.4437 0.7700
Residual standard error: 1.853 on 17019 degrees of freedom, Adjusted R2: 0.6357
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05
Table 3: Effect on final number of bidders
C Instrumental Variable Regression
As described in section 5, Instrumental Variable (IV) Regression can isolate the
direct effects of the price pattern, i.e. disregard the indirect effect on the entry
of new bidders and only see the direct effect on prices. The results of this IV
regression, i.e. the direct effect on P/V, is listed in Table 5 below using both jumps
and the Beta distribution to describe the price pattern.
IV Regression: IV Regression:
Jumps Beta distribution
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
Intercept -0.4160 0.1520 ** -0.6961 0.1692 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 -0.1120 0.0136 *** - -
jump2 0.4-0.5 0.0391 0.0233 - -
jump3 0.4-0.5 0.0764 0.0242 ** - -
jump4 0.4-0.5 0.0587 0.0260 * - -
jump5 0.4-0.5 0.0891 0.0254 *** - -
jump6 0.4-0.5 0.0544 0.0156 *** - -
jump7 0.4-0.5 0.0629 0.0157 *** - -
jump3h 0.4-0.5 0.1530 0.0149 *** - -
jump15min 0.4-0.5 0.1750 0.0223 *** - -
jump1 >0.5 0.0147 0.0153 - -
jump2 >0.5 0.1500 0.0256 *** - -
jump3 >0.5 0.1850 0.0244 *** - -
jump4 >0.5 0.2060 0.0252 *** - -
jump5 >0.5 0.2110 0.0246 *** - -
jump6 >0.5 0.1910 0.0167 *** - -
jump7 >0.5 0.1770 0.0158 *** - -
jump3h >0.5 0.3610 0.0171 *** - -
jump15min >0.5 0.2840 0.0282 *** - -
a11 : ln(αˆ) - - 0.0948 0.0035 ***
a12 : ln(αˆ)2 - - -0.0092 0.0007 ***
a21 : ln( ˆβ) - - -0.0266 0.0049 ***
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error
a22 : ln( ˆβ)2 - - 0.0139 0.0009 ***
Valuation -0.0002 0.0000 *** -0.0003 0.0000 ***
N24h 0.4280 0.0309 *** 0.5809 0.0410 ***
(N24h)2 -0.0303 0.0036 *** -0.0460 0.0047 ***
(N24h)3 0.0006 0.0001 *** 0.0010 0.0002 ***
Valuation*N24h 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 ***
factor(Category)Modern furniture - tables and chairs -0.0282 0.0072 *** -0.0349 0.0077 ***
factor(Month)2 0.0049 0.0179 0.0224 0.0192
factor(Month)3 -0.0424 0.0184 * -0.0212 0.0197
factor(Month)4 -0.0344 0.0180 -0.0073 0.0193
factor(Month)5 -0.0301 0.0176 0.0036 0.0188
factor(Month)6 -0.0236 0.0175 0.0168 0.0188
factor(Month)7 -0.0464 0.0198 * -0.0144 0.0212
factor(Month)8 -0.0290 0.0176 0.0025 0.0189
factor(Month)9 -0.0700 0.0170 *** -0.0361 0.0182 *
factor(Month)10 -0.0808 0.0178 *** -0.0571 0.0190 **
factor(Month)11 -0.0799 0.0174 *** -0.0467 0.0187 *
factor(Month)12 -0.0759 0.0182 *** -0.0376 0.0196
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0023 0.0098 0.0022 0.0105
factor(Ends weekday)3 0.0029 0.0099 0.0100 0.0106
factor(Ends weekday)4 0.0008 0.0104 0.0053 0.0111
factor(Ends weekday)5 -0.0052 0.0104 -0.0038 0.0112
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0692 0.0484 -0.1104 0.0517
factor(Ends weekday)7 -0.2970 0.2100 -0.3787 0.2240
factor(Time of day)8 -0.0735 0.1360 -0.0633 0.1453
factor(Time of day)9 -0.0684 0.1340 -0.0852 0.1429
factor(Time of day)10 -0.0702 0.1330 -0.0953 0.1424
factor(Time of day)11 -0.0576 0.1330 -0.0770 0.1422
factor(Time of day)12 -0.0536 0.1330 -0.0761 0.1421
factor(Time of day)13 -0.0495 0.1330 -0.0646 0.1419
factor(Time of day)14 -0.0404 0.1330 -0.0548 0.1418
factor(Time of day)15 -0.0340 0.1330 -0.0407 0.1419
factor(Time of day)16 -0.0170 0.1330 -0.0245 0.1421
factor(Time of day)17 -0.0283 0.1330 -0.0363 0.1423
factor(Time of day)18 -0.0267 0.1390 -0.0261 0.1479
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0090 0.1710 -0.0544 0.1830
factor(Time of day)20 0.0526 0.1740 0.0733 0.1858
factor(Time of day)22 -0.1060 0.4390 -0.0706 0.4698
factor(Time of day)23 -0.1600 0.1740 -0.1911 0.1857
Residual standard error: 0.4182 Residual standard error: 0.4471
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05 on 17019 degrees of freedom on 17033 degrees of freedom
Table 4: Instrumental Variable Regressions
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D Returned
The Danish Sale of Goods Act specifies 14 days of right to return for all trade on
the internet with private consumers. There has been some discussion on whether
internet auctions like Lauritz.com are included in this, but for now they are. Hence,
all private winners have two weeks to regret their purchase.
Naturally, Laurtiz.com is trying to discourage the use of this right to return as this
may encourage reckless or perhaps even fake bidding. Also, returned items have
to be put on auction again. Although this right is described on the auctions site, it
may not be clear to all users. Furthermore, buyers must in principal pay for the item
within 3 days while you will only get your money back within a 30 days period.
Here, I have modeled the actual return as logit regression in order to find the factors
that have a positive or negative influence on the probability to return. The result of
this logit regression is listed in Table 6 below.
Estimate Std. Error
(Intercept) -5.8920 1.1840 ***
jump1 0.4-0.5 0.0095 0.1375
jump2 0.4-0.5 0.6969 0.1887 ***
jump3 0.4-0.5 -0.0049 0.2441
jump4 0.4-0.5 0.1401 0.2454
jump5 0.4-0.5 0.1495 0.2520
jump6 0.4-0.5 -0.0290 0.1602
jump7 0.4-0.5 -0.3257 0.1825 .
jump3h 0.4-0.5 -0.0635 0.1496
jump15min 0.4-0.5 -0.3136 0.2546
jump1 >0.5 0.2330 0.1221 .
jump2 >0.5 0.2777 0.2134
jump3 >0.5 0.5374 0.1861 **
jump4 >0.5 0.4896 0.2053 *
jump5 >0.5 0.4939 0.1880 **
jump6 >0.5 0.1646 0.1279
jump7 >0.5 0.2457 0.1295 .
jump3h >0.5 0.1449 0.1490
jump15min >0.5 -0.0558 0.2941
Valuation 0.0001 0.0000 ***
N 0.0765 0.0178 ***
Valuation*N 0.0000 0.0000 **
factor(Category)Modern furniture - tables and chairs -0.0184 0.0702
factor(Month)2 -1.8220 1.1190
factor(Month)3 1.6130 0.5380 **
factor(Month)4 2.3740 0.5181 ***
factor(Month)5 2.7420 0.5120 ***
factor(Month)6 2.9270 0.5104 ***
factor(Month)7 3.0530 0.5158 ***
Continued on next page
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Estimate Std. Error
factor(Month)8 3.0070 0.5102 ***
factor(Month)9 3.1580 0.5077 ***
factor(Month)10 3.2130 0.5093 ***
factor(Month)11 3.0860 0.5094 ***
factor(Month)12 3.2170 0.5104 ***
factor(Ends weekday)2 -0.0414 0.0978
factor(Ends weekday)3 -0.0153 0.0975
factor(Ends weekday)4 0.0473 0.1003
factor(Ends weekday)5 0.0392 0.1006
factor(Ends weekday)6 -0.0019 0.4747
factor(Ends weekday)7 -10.0600 155.2000
factor(Time of day)8 -0.1953 1.1020
factor(Time of day)9 0.1373 1.0710
factor(Time of day)10 -0.1845 1.0670
factor(Time of day)11 -0.1160 1.0650
factor(Time of day)12 -0.1840 1.0630
factor(Time of day)13 -0.1515 1.0620
factor(Time of day)14 -0.4162 1.0620
factor(Time of day)15 -0.3470 1.0620
factor(Time of day)16 -0.3732 1.0650
factor(Time of day)17 -0.6352 1.0700
factor(Time of day)18 0.0914 1.1180
factor(Time of day)19 -0.0796 1.4990
factor(Time of day)20 -0.6189 1.5010
factor(Time of day)22 14.8000 324.7000
factor(Time of day)23 -0.3891 1.4880
Residual deviance: 7696.9 on 17021 degrees of freedom
Significant codes: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05
Table 5: The logit regression for return
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